Internet-Draft unprotected-evidence December 2024
Usama Sardar Expires 23 June 2025 [Page]
Workgroup:
RATS Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-usama-rats-unprotected-evidence-latest
Updates:
9334 (if approved)
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Author:
M. Usama Sardar
TU Dresden

Using Conveyance Protocol for Unprotected Evidence in RATS Architecture

Abstract

This document provides corrections to RFC9334.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-usama-rats-unprotected-evidence/.

Discussion of this document takes place on the RATS Working Group mailing list (mailto:rats@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rats/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/rats-unprotected-evidence.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 June 2025.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

RFC9334 presents the RATS architecture. However, some parts of the specification contain errors that may lead to misinterpretations and even insecure implementations. This document provides corrections to RFC9334.

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Corrections

Section 7.4 of [RFC9334] has:

A conveyance protocol that provides authentication and integrity protection can be used to convey Evidence that is otherwise unprotected (e.g., not signed).

Using a conveyance protocol that provides authentication and integrity protection, such as TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], to convey Evidence that is otherwise unprotected (e.g., not signed) undermines all security of remote attestation. Essentially, this breaks up the chain up to the root of trust. Effectively, remote attestation provides no protection in this case and the security guarantees are limited to those of the conveyance protocol only. In order to benefit from remote attestation, it is recommended that Evidence MUST be protected using dedicated keys chaining back to the root of trust.

4. Security Considerations

All of this document is about security considerations.

5. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

6. References

6.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9334]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334>.

6.2. Informative References

[RFC8446]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.

Author's Address

Muhammad Usama Sardar
TU Dresden